Balance of power and the prospects for peace: the case of the Levant by Green, Ryan J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2002-12
Balance of power and the prospects for peace: the
case of the Levant
Green, Ryan J.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3838









BALANCE OF POWER AND THE PROSPECTS FOR 








 Thesis Advisor:   Glenn E. Robinson 
















































 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
July 2001 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:   
      Balance of Power and the Prospects for Peace: The Case of the Levant 
6. AUTHOR: LT Ryan J. Green, USN 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
UL 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Over the past 50 years, the Levant has seen more political violence than any other region in the 
world.  This thesis argues that the root cause of this violence is the vast imbalance of power 
between Israel and its neighbors.  Such an imbalance naturally leads to the more powerful 
country – in this case, Israel – to resort to force in pursuing Israeli interests.  Similary, the 
imbalance of power acts as a constant reminder of humiliation for the less powerful, 
compelling these actors to seek to right the imbalance through the use of more unconventional 
warfare.  The end result of power imbalance is perpetual conflict.  This thesis focuses on the 
imbalance of power between Israel and Syria as measured through both military and economic 
might.  This imbalance has been expressed in differing forms of violence by both sides. 
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
79 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Levant, Israel, Syria, Balance of Power, Military, Economic 

















    
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  




















































Approved for Public Release; Distribution is unlimited 
 
 
BALANCE OF POWER AND THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE: THE CASE OF 
THE LEVANT 
 
Ryan J. Green 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., University of Utah, 1997 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 











Author:  Ryan J. Green 
    
 
 








James A. Wirtz 
























































Over the past 50 years, the Levant has seen more political violence than any other 
region in the world.  This thesis argues that the root cause of this violence is the vast 
imbalance of power between Israel and its neighbors.  Such an imbalance naturally leads 
to the more powerful country – in this case, Israel – to resort to force in pursuing Israeli 
interests.  Similary, the imbalance of power acts as a constant reminder of humiliation for 
the less powerful, compelling these actors to seek to right the imbalance through the use 
of more unconventional warfare.  The end result of power imbalance is perpetual conflict.  
This thesis focuses on the imbalance of power between Israel and Syria as measured 
through both military and economic might.  This imbalance has been expressed in 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.   PURPOSE 
The intent of this thesis is to examine the question, how has the extreme 
imbalance of power between Israel and Syria affected stability and security throughout 
the Levant?  I contend that this imbalance has decreased stability and has increased 
security concerns for the Levant countries.  The thesis will illustrate that the ongoing 
conflict in the region arose from a huge disparity in wealth and military strength between 
the two nations.  The paper is divided into five sections:  this introduction, three chapters 
that constitute the body of the work, and a conclusion with several policy 
recommendations. Before expanding on each of the chapters, the introduction will 
explain why this thesis question is such an important topic of study today, and what 
methodologies were used to carry out the work. 
The Levant is a critical region, consisting of Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt 
and the Palestinians, for Americans to understand for several reasons.  First and foremost 
is the intifada between Israel and the Palestinians. The fighting from the intifada has 
pushed the economies of the Levant states into a recession.  Furthermore, fighting has 
spilled over in the past two years to include other regional powers such as Syria, where 
for example, there has been a sharp increase in Syrian military clashes with Israeli troops.  
Hundreds have died with no sign of a resolution.  Second, the recent terror attacks against 
the United States were spawned in part by the failure of U.S. leaders to show concern for 
Arab rights in the region.  Third, the fear of another oil embargo led by the region’s 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members has increased tension 
worldwide.  Although the Saudi royal family has ensured the United States that oil will 
not be used as a political weapon, they could conceivably be forced to cease oil 
shipments to Western nations in order to maintain regime’s internal legitimacy.   Finally, 
increasing violence and unrest in the region is having a serious negative impact on the 
world economy. Given the deepening economic interdependence brought by 
globalization, failing markets could reach a global epidemic if a resolution to Middle 
Eastern violence is not soon reached.  
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1.  Regional Violence 
The Levant has spawned two indigenous forms of violence that I have termed 
“hegemonic violence” and “rebellious raids.”  Hegemonic violence is action taken by the 
dominant regional state to establish and maintain control of a specified area or other state.  
Rebellious raids, by contrast, are used by a weaker state (usually official or non-state 
organizations within states) to inflict pain on the hegemon.1  The American Revolution 
provides an example of the difference between the two forms of violence.  In this war, 
England was the dominant power inflicting hegemonic violence.  The British army 
controlled the fighting and would decimate the Americans whenever the two met in 
pitched battle.  In contrast, George Washington used highly effective “hit and run” 
rebellious raids against the British to avoid being slaughtered, and to inflict pain and 
suffering on the British until the rebels’ French allies arrived.  
A second and more recent example is the Algerian revolution against a hegemonic 
France in 1954.  The Algerians conducted rebellious raids to inflict pain on French 
settlers and the French army, whom they could not hope to defeat in conventional battle. 
In the end, those rebellious raids took such a toll on the French that Algeria won its 
independence.  It is important to understand both the difference between the two forms of 
fighting, and their role in the current Levantine violence. 
2. Hegemonic Violence Within the Levant 
The result of the power imbalance in the Levant is violence.  Hegemonic attacks 
in this case are overwhelming displays of force coming from Israel.  Examples include 
the occupation of southern Lebanon and to some extent the recent violence in the West 
Bank. In each of these examples, Israel demonstrated that it has the capability to use 
overwhelming force to dictate policies and protect Israeli land. The power imbalance 
arises from the huge disparity in defense capabilities between Israel and Syria, and the 
Israeli economy’s vastly greater strength.  
   
                                                 
1 Examples of violent groups within states would be Hamas, Hizb Allah, Islamic Jihad and Fatah. 
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 The occupation of southern Lebanon by Israel illustrated that a military imbalance 
in the Israelis’ favor allowed them to take lands at will and turn them into quasi-
provinces.  The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) moved into southern Lebanon in 1978, and 
held it for approximately 25 years.  Granted, during this time there were small skirmishes 
in which the combined forces of the Islamist organization Hizb Allah, the Lebanese 
Army, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and the Syrians were able to inflict 
casualties on the IDF.  Nevertheless, this occupation provides another example of Israel’s 
overwhelming ability to conduct large-scale operations at will because of superior 
firepower. 
 The second example of hegemonic violence by Israel was the Israeli invasion of 
the West Bank in April 2002.  During the subsequent occupation, the IDF not only 
arrested thousands of Palestinians and held territory under marshal law with a well-
enforced curfew, but it also partially leveled the refugee camp of Jenin.  Again, Israel’s 
ability to control land and people through violence is directly linked to its vast 
preponderance of power. 
3. Rebellious Raids 
The second form of violence I discuss is the guerrilla-style skirmish used by 
weaker nations (in this paper, primarily Syria) to harass the hegemon.  Examples of such 
attacks include raids during the 1973 War, attacks by Hizb Allah against Israeli positions 
in southern Lebanon, and the suicide bombings of today.  Using terrorist organizations to 
aide in attacking Israel proved an effective weapon for Syria. Syria’s inferior military 
power, however, confined the raids to minor engagements that did nothing to diminish 
Israel’s balance of power advantage. 
Israel was victorious in the 1973 war with Syria and Egypt.  This war nevertheless 
proved that weaker nations such as Syria and Egypt could inflict pain and suffering on 
the hegemon. Swift surprise attacks from the Sinai and southern Lebanon inflicted 
hundreds of casualties on the Israelis.  While these attacks were the limit that the weaker 
nations could accomplish, the psychological impact was devastating.  No longer was 
Israel safe because of military might, but rather the weaker nations had found a way to 
inflict suffering.   
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The use of terrorists such as Hizb Allah to carry out actions also became more 
prevalent after the 1973 war.  Terrorist groups continually harassed Israel with rocket 
attacks and suicide bombings.  These attacks further outraged the Israelis while 
demonstrating to the Arabs that Israel was vulnerable after all. 
      
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will use the case study of relations between Israel and Syria to 
demonstrate that there is a devastating imbalance of power between the two states.  
Furthermore, I will argue that this imbalance of power is the source of violent action in 
the region.  The focus of the thesis is on both the military and economic imbalances that 
have persisted over time.  Moreover, Israel has signed peace agremments with Egypt, 
following the 1973 war, and Jordan in 1994, unlike Syira and by proxy Lebanon.  
Therefore, Egypt and Jordan are not plausible comparative states to understand the 
prolonged violence in the Levant.  An in-depth case study, between Israel and Syria, is 
the most expedient means to explain why the region is so troubled.  
  
C. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II examines the military imbalance of power between Israel and Syria.  
This chapter presents data on the relative strengths of the military forces of the two 
opponents.   I detail the army, navy and air force of each state in the first two sections, in 
order to establish empirically that the Israelis have a distinct military advantage over the 
Syrians.  The final section of the chapter then analyzes the data presented.  The results 
illustrate a military advantage for Israel that is unprecedented in the region.  This military 
advantage is a primary contributor to the instability of the region, spurred by a balance of 
power competition. 
Chapter III focuses on the economic imbalance of power between Israel and 
Syria.  This chapter examines three factors that affect economic strength:  gross national 
product (GNP); percent growth over time; and the effect that a high technology sector can 
have on GNP.  Chapter III will show that the Israeli economy is strong, with a healthy 
GNP, steady growth, and control of a solid percentage of the world high technology 
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market.  In contrast, the data on Syria will illustrate the country’s lack of a solid 
economic base by each of these measures.  The percent of market share in high 
technology in and of itself is not an indicator of a strong economy; in this case study, 
however, it serves as a proxy indicator that a country has a modern, globally engaged 
economy.  Thus, the finding that Syria lacks the modern economy that Israel possesses 
further supports the conclusion that an imbalance exists between Syria and Israel. 
 Chapter IV applies balance of power theory to the Levant as a means of 
explaining the region’s ongoing violence.  This chapter is derived from a realist balance 
of power approach with a few slight modifications.  I draw my arguments from Partha 
Chatterjee’s The Classical Balance of Power Theory.2  I also draw on Emerson M. S. 
Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook’s A Theory of the Balance of Power in International 
Systems3 to simplify and enhance the application of the theory.  A critical combination of 
the two pieces provides a working model that will give readers a clear understanding of 
the reasons behind the turbulence in the Levant. 
The conclusion of this thesis focuses on the prospects for peace between Israel 
and Syria.  This section discusses the impact that power balancing has on security in the 
Levant.  Furthermore, it will make clear recommendations that could, if implemented, 
lead to a signed peace agreement between Israel and Syria.  Such an agreement not only 
would ease security issues, but would benefit the economies of all nations in the region.  
Robust economic activity in turn is critical to creating a lasting peace in the region.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Chatterjee, P., “The Classical Balance of Power Theory,” Journal of Peace Research, Volume 9, 
Issue 1, 1972, p. 52. 
3 Niou, E. M.S. & Ordeshook, P. C., “A Theory of the Balance of Power in International Systems,” 
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II. THE MILITARY IMBALANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
   
This chapter illustrates the extent of the military imbalance between Israel and 
Syria.  The purpose is to demonstrate that instability between the two nations is best 
explained from a balance of power perspective.  When a regional power possesses much 
stronger armed forces than its neighbors, they will feel compelled to develop strong 
militaries as well.  The resulting arms race further exacerbates instability and insecurity 
because there will always be a perceived or actual comparative imbalance.  Furthermore, 
pitting forces against one another, as Syria and Israel have done, is highly destabilizing, 
as neither nation can predict the potential actions of its opponent.  For this reason, the 
northern border of Israel remains extremely tense, relying on an active military presence 
to maintain peace. 
 The chapter is divided into three main sections.  The first two detail the Israeli and 
Syrian armed forces divided by service:  army, navy and air force.  The focus is on 
manning, equipment and training. The subsections on equipment probably are the most 
pivotal because they show clearly the biggest advantage for Israel:  modern equipment 
and the ability to maintain it.  The final subsection for each military, on training, shows 
how an effective training program promotes the efficiency indispensable to winning 
battles. 
 The third section presents an analysis of the disparities between the two rivals’ 
armed forces. The data will show that the Israelis have a large advantage in two of the 
three areas, equipment and training, while the third area, manning, is relatively closely 
matched.  This imbalance in equipment and training is critical to Israel’s success in 
military action.  The ongoing conflict with the Palestinians has provided the Israelis with 





B. THE ISRAELI MILITARY 
One school of thought argues that the Israeli military advantage is shrinking.4  
Many who argue this point, however, look specifically to Egypt as the counterbalance to 
Israeli power.  Although the Egyptian military has trained with the American military and 
has begun to develop doctrine similar to that of the United States, Israel’s qualitative 
edge not only persists, but has grown throughout the 1990s.5    
1. Army 
 I have divided this section into manning, equipment (weapons) and training, in 
order to make the data on the army’s actual strength accessible, and the results--whether 
or not a balance of power exists--more evident.   
a. Manning 
The manpower of the Israeli military has not grown over the last fifteen 
years.  At the end of the 1970s, Israel’s army was twice as large as that of Syria.  By 
1993, however, the gap had shrunk to about 1.3 times as great.6  The number of regular 
ground troops alone rose from 176,000 to 187,000, while the entire Israeli ground forces-
-reserves, regular troops, tanks, artillery and air defense artillery-- totaled 521,000.7  A 
half million people in service is a good number to safeguard any homeland.  By 
comparison, the United States Marine Corps numbers roughly 180,000, including 
aviation and combat service support. The United States Army totals around 700,000 
people.  Overall, the Israeli Defense Force constitutes a top line fighting force. 
                                                 
4 This school of thought concentrates on the Egyptians as a counter to Israel.  Such scholars include 
Michael T. Clare; “The Unnoticed Arms Trade: Exports of Conventional Arms-making Technology,” 
International Security; Volume 8; 1990; p. 68.  Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlsen, eds. 1986, Arms 
Production in the Third World; Stephanie G. Neuman. 1984. “International Stratification and Third World 
Military Industries,” International Organization; Issue 38; 1997; p. 167; Alex Mintz and Michael D. Ward, 
“The Political Economy of Military Spending in Israel,” The American Political Science Review Issue 2, 
1983; p. 521. 
5 Heller, M. A., Shapir, Y., The Middle East Military Balance 1997, Columbia University Press, 1999, 
p. 34. 
6 Shalev, A., Israel and Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan, Westview Press, 1994, p. 116. 
7 Heller and Shapir, p. 232. 
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The manning levels over the past fifteen years follow a fairly cyclical 
pattern of increases and cutbacks, according to the level of perceived threat.  From the 
mid-1980s through about 1992, the Israelis believed that a strong military was needed to 
combat the coalition of regional Arab forces arrayed against them.  During this period, 
the IDF maintained a large number of personnel on active duty in anticipation of a 
possible attack, most likely from Syria.  This posture lasted up through 1991 and the 
second Gulf War.   From 1991 through 1996, the Israeli military went through drastic 
cutbacks and down-sizing, a Clinton-like reform.  Heller and Shapir elaborate why this 
shift in ideology occurred: 
There were three causes for the change: a change in intelligence 
assessments regarding Syria, cuts in the defense budget and other 
budgetary constraints, and a change of approach toward the Palestinian 
Authority and the possibility of a serious deterioration in relations with the 
Palestinians.  Mirkam-2000’s basic working assumption was that the 
chances of war with Syria, the main enemy, were very low.8 
In short, the Israelis believed that the potential for war was low, thus there 
was no need to risk exacerbating tensions with a military build-up.  The other 
development that encouraged lower levels of manpower in this period was the signing of 
a pivotal peace agreement with Jordan.  The Israel-Jordanian peace agreement allowed 
the two signatories to invest resources in their economies.  When quality of life begins to 
improve, no one wants to risk prosperity by going to war.  By the end of 1996, however, 
Israel had begun to re-invest in its military, after its intelligence services reported the 
Syrian threat to be greater than first thought. 
b. Equipment   
The Israeli ground forces are highly mechanized.  Throughout the 1980s, 
the inventory for heavy equipment numbered around 4,000 tanks and nearly 11,000 other 
armored personnel carriers (APC).9  The number of Israel’s armored vehicles is nearly 
equal to that of the combined strength of Egypt, Jordan and Syria.  Moreover, the might 
of the Israeli ground forces is amplified by their superiority in artillery:  “principally self-
                                                 
8 Heller and Shapir, p. 50. 
9 Metz, H. C., Israel: A Country Study, Library of Congress, 1990, p. 283. 
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propelled and equipped with advanced fire control systems and high-performance 
munitions.”10  Superior artillery allows accurate fire suppression of enemy targets and 
close support for the ground forces. Chart 1 shows the approximate equipment inventory 
of the Israeli Defense Force (exact numbers are not available). 
Chart 1 
 
Exact numbers of artillery pieces also were unavailable; Heller and Shapir, 
however, estimate that number to be just below 2,000 guns.  These guns ranged from 
290mm to 155mm howitzers, along with a hodgepodge of self-propelled and towed guns 
and howitzers, while the mortars numbered around 40.13 Aside from impressive 
quantities of weaponry, the quality of artillery the IDF maintains tends to be state-of-the-
art. 
c. Training 
   Two different types of training distinguish the Israeli army.  First is the 
basic and advanced training that every solider receives. This distinction in the type of 
training offers the soldier rewards, such as becoming a NCO or even an officer.  The 
                                                 
10 Ibid. p. 283. 
11 The total number of tanks in the IDF inventory is estimated to be around 3,900. Actual numbers are 
classified.  This data was obtained from Heller and Shapir; p. 233. 
12 Heller and Shapir again cite that the total number reaches 8,010 APCs when incorporating the 
second tier equipment. P. 234. 
13 Ibid. p. 234. 
Tanks Total 
Merkava & 
M-60A-3 (upgradeable to A-7) 
2,120 in service11 
APC’s:  Total: 
Achzarit and M-113 Unknown 
 
Nagmashot, Nagmachon, Nakpadon & RBY  5,325 in service12 
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second type of training is the continued technical training necessary for Israeli personnel 
to maintain and use their high-tech weapons.   
  Moreover, the distinction in training provides all recruits with knowledge 
of the advantages of military service.  Israel requires all males at the age of eighteen to 
serve in the armed forces.  Therefore, providing the knowledge that a distinction exists 
generally prompts some recruits to remain in service. Upon induction at the age of 
eighteen, recruits are separated into three different categories: generalized, women’s 
corps and corps/brigade.14  The generalized service is for non-combat and female units. 
Generalized trainees are offered an indoctrination into military life that 
lasts only one month, as the majority of their service will not require combat training.  
The corps/brigade section trains recruits for combat roles:  tanks, artillery and infantry.  
Corps training, which generally refers to all non-infantry combat units such as armor and 
artillery, employs an arduous program designed to ready a soldier for battle. Brigade 
training lasts up to five months and is the most rigorous of all.  From brigade training the 
Israeli armed forces reap infantrymen, and airborne and special forces soldiers (who then 
receive yet further specialized training).  Once members of the IDF graduate from their 
respective basic training, the next evolution is advanced training. 
  Advanced training is primarily for corps recruits, to teach them the 
maintenance and operation of the equipment they will be using. For this, an additional 
three months of school is required for all corps personnel.  The next level of advanced 
training is NCO and officer training.  Those recruits who distinguish themselves in their 
company or battalion are made to attend NCO school.  This is a chance to lead within the 
unit and earn promotions.  Furthermore, if while in NCO training servicemen set 
themselves apart from the rest of the pack, they will receive an offer to attend officer 
training school.15  Altogether, the Israeli army’s training process is complex, and for the 
most part yields dedicated soldiers. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Metz, p. 291. 
15 Ibid. p. 292. 
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2. Navy 
Although by world standards the Israeli navy is small, as a regional power it is a 
very professional force with devastating capabilities.  A long-neglected arm of Israel’s 
military forces, the Israeli navy won acclaim during the 1973 war, when it sank eight 
Arab missile boats without any losses to itself.  This dramatic success led to a flurry of 
planning to enhance the navy’s capabilities. There was no marked improvement, 
however, until the late 1980s; during most of that decade Israel was preoccupied with 
detecting and engaging PLO terrorists infiltrating from the Red Sea.16  It emphasizes fast 
coastal patrol boats, while boasting a few French corvettes and submarines to assist in 
blue water operations. 
a.    Manning 
Through the end of the 1980s, the Israeli Navy comprised approximately 
9,000 personnel.  Of this number, 1,000 were officers; the other 8,000 included 
approximately 3,200 conscripts, with an additional 1,000 reservists.17  The end of the 
1980s saw rekindled interest among policymakers for building a stronger, more potent 
navy, and from early 1993 on-ward Israel began to receive the support it needed to 
modernize.  While the navy is still the most neglected branch of the Israeli armed forces, 
its number of personnel has increased dramatically, to approximately 19,500.  The total is 
split almost directly in half, with 9,500 in the active navy and around 10,000 in the 
reserves.18 
b.    Equipment 
The navy’s equipment reflects Israel’s primary concern with coastal 
defense.  The surface ships, including three missile corvettes, are designed to handle the 
littoral, with limited blue water ability.  The Israeli navy maintains only four operational 
submarines, which are its primary strategic weapon.  There are no carriers in the Israeli 
fleet.  ( See Appendix One for a list of ships in the Israeli navy.)19   
                                                 
16 Metz, p. 284. 
17 Ibid. p. 283. 
18 Heller and Shapir, p. 233. 
19 Appendix one provides ships class, numbers in service and the armament that each class contains. 
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c.  Training 
       There is limited information on training regimes in the Israeli navy.  What 
there is suggests that the routine is similar to that of the army in that, in the absence of 
service academies, officers are skimmed from the enlisted ranks.20  Furthermore, once a 
sailor obtains basic seamanship training, the only way to learn a job is to become 
operational.  
3. Air Force 
 The Israeli air force is a highly professional force that avails itself of the finest 
military equipment the United States has to offer.  The service won acclaim during the 
1967 war, which success led to a decade of increased support, manpower and prestige.  It 
further distinguished itself with the 1981 bombing of the Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq.  
The first time the Israeli air force demonstrated its ability to conduct in-flight refueling 
came during the bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 1985.  Early successes 
ensured the air force’s future growth. 
a. Manning 
By the late 1980s, the Israeli air force consisted of about 28,000 personnel, 
of whom approximately 9,000 were professionals and 19,000 were conscripts.  It also 
maintained about 50,000 reservists.21  The trend of increasing manpower would continue 
into the following decade.  By the end of the 1990s, active forces stood at 36,500, the 
reserve force at 54,000, placing the grand total at 90,500.22  
b.      Equipment 
This section looks only at the combat aircraft of the Israeli air force.  The 
total, of 778 craft includes any airplanes that are used for munitions delivery.23  (The 
Israelis also maintain a fleet of support aircraft that handle such tasks as transportation 
and refueling.)  By this measure, Israel’s advantage over Syria is significant.  In addition, 
                                                 
20 Metz, p. 284. 
21 Ibid. p. 285. 
22 Heller and Shapir, p. 233. 
23 All data again was obtained from Heller and Shapir; p. 236-238. 
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the United States makes the highest quality equipment available to Israel on 
advantageous terms (refer to Appendix Two for complete details). 
c.    Training 
          Learning to fly is relatively universal. Flight dynamics are the same in any 
region of the world.  The Israeli basic pilot training is similar to that of the United States.   
Therefore, the Israelis have distinct advantages over regional rivals.  First, the United 
States regularly sends pilots and air mechanics to Israel to train airmen on the proper 
procedures to maintain all aircraft.  The American pilots also provide vital training that 
ensures the young Israeli pilots are the crème of the region.  The United States also 
invites Israeli pilots to train at American air force bases, thus providing the Israelis with 
the most up-to-date training on the air platforms.  This state-of-the-art training provided 
by the United Staes is a distinct tactical advantage for Israeli Pilots. 
 
C. THE SYRIAN MILITARY 
The Syrian armed forces have seen a definite decline in the last fifteen years.  
From the late 1970s through the late 1980s, with the backing of the Soviet Union, the 
Syrian military was in a position to rival any military in the region.  As Soviet power 
began to decline, however, its gifts of weapons to Syria to ward off the United States and 
Israel ceased, and the USSR (later Russia) began to require hard currency for any 
weapons it provided 
1. Army 
The army has been the backbone of the Syrian military, but even so, data suggests 
it cannot match Israel’s strength. I, again, have broken the section into manning, 
equipment and training. 
a. Manning   
The 1980s were the final major growth period for the Syrian military.  
During this phase of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was determined to match the United 
States in all regions throughout the world.  In the Levant, Syria was a Soviet proxy that 
benefited greatly over a short period.  At its apex in 1985, the Syrian army consisted of 
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500,000 regular troops and 340,000 reservists.24  When the Soviet Union collapsed in 
1990, the Syrian Army lost the vital assistance that had made it a dominating force in the 
region. The Russian Federation, unlike its predecessor, needed hard currency for its arms.  
As a result, the Syrian military began to decay in the 1990s.  Manpower dwindled to 
406,000:  306,000 regulars and 100,000 reservists, a decline from 1985 in excess of 50 
percent.25  Besides the loss of Soviet support, a poor economy forced Damascus to spend 
money on more immediate needs than the military. 
b.     Equipment  
Equipment quality and quantity are difficult to assess accurately, not 
because numbers are too small, but because the numbers seem highly inflated.  The 
inaccuracy appears in part to be because the Syrians seem to count equipment that was 
promised but never delivered during the Cold War, and more importantly, equipment that 
is out of commission.  The purpose may be to deter neighboring states from taking the 
offensive.  Appendix Three,26 which details Syrian equipment, may not provide accurate 
data, and it is more than likely that actual numbers are far smaller than those shown. 
  The Syrian Army maintains three types of self-propelled howitzers:  2x 
122mm and 1x 152mm for 505 guns.  In the towed gun section, there are seven types:  3x 
122mm, 1x 130mm, 2x152mm and 1x180mm.  There are two mortars over 160mm:  
240mm and 160mm and one under 160mm, the 120mm mortar system.  Overall, the 
artillery and mortar section of the Syrian arsenal consists of approximately 2,100 
different weapons.27 
 c.  Training 
  The Syrian Army’s training program is different from that of the IDF.  
While the Syrians do maintain general basic training for all enlisted personnel and 
conscripts, officers are not garnered from the enlisted ranks, but rather groomed at the 
military academy in Homs.28  This is a two-year program that generates primarily 
                                                 
24 Collelo, T., Syria A Country Study, Library of Congress, 1988, p. 257. 
25 Heller and Shapir, p. 362. 
26 Appendix Three focuses on tanks and armored personnel carriers 
27 All data for the Syrian Army was obtained from Heller and Shapir, p. 363. 
28 Collelo, p. 261. 
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infantry officers.  Officers and recruits attend advanced training in other specialties, as 
well.  Furthermore, officers may be selected for tours in Russian military academies, to 
further their education and value. 
  Syrian operational training consists of watching the Israelis on maneuvers 
in the Golan, then moving a tank approximately fifty feet forward and fifty feet back 
again.  While this sounds preposterous, such maneuvers are due to a lack of money for 
fuel, which has a heavy impact on training.  Moreover, the bulk of Syrian military 
equipment is falling apart, and there is no money for the spare parts to fix them.    
2. Navy 
In the last fifteen years, manning and the equipment in the Syrian navy have 
remained fairly constant.  Syrian tradition does not accord prestige to the navy, therefore 
it has not received the necessary funds to develop along with the army and the air force.   
a. Manning   
While the 1980s saw a dramatic increase in funds to the army and the air 
force, the navy was left alone.  By 1985, the Syrian navy reached its maximum size with 
a total of 6,500 personnel:  4,000 regulars and 2,500 reservists.29  These numbers have 
not appreciably changed over the past decade.30  The manning of the Syrian navy is far 
below that of the Israelis, and therefore is a cause of tension between the navy and the 
government.  Although the primary function of the Syrian navy, coastal defense, is 
similar to that of the Israeli navy, the Syrians have believed that there was a more 
credible threat from the land and the air.  
b. Equipment  
The Syrian Navy’s equipment is inferior to that of its Israeli counterpart.  
For instance, Syria’s Romeo class submarines are no longer operational, nor are the 
Komar-class fast patrol boat and the Vanya-class mine warfare vessel.31  Without these 
vessels, Syria does not have a notable navy.  Appendix Four, which details the Syrian 
Navy’s assets, shows quite a few holes in Syrian coastal defenses. 
                                                 
29 Collelo, p. 259. 
30 Heller and Shapir, p. 262. 
31 Ibid. p. 369-370, moreover, the three classes of boats are unserviceable. 
 17
c. Training  
 Training in the Syrian navy is non-existent.  The navy is subordinate to 
the army and subsequently does not receive the time or the money properly to train 
sailors. If any Syrian sailor were expected to defend the coast, or a ship for that matter, 
the lack of war fighting skills would be disastrous.  
3. Air Force  
The air force has seen the biggest swing in its fortunes over the last fifteen years.  
At the height of the Syrian military build up in the 1980s, the air force had approximately 
140,000 airmen.32 Severe budget cuts after the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, 
compelled the air force to draw down, and it eventually begin to decay on the runway. 
a. Manning 
       Throughout the 1980s, the air force maintained 100,000 regular airman 
(officer and enlisted) and 37,500 reservists.33  At that time, the Soviet Union was 
supplying the Syrian air force with airplanes, training and spare parts to maintain the 
planes.  The collapse of the USSR in 1990 forced the Syrian air force to downsize over 
the following decade to 30,000 regular airmen and 10,000 reservists.34 The air force lost 
manpower because the aircraft were breaking down and left unrepaired, so no flight hours 
could be logged.  The breakdowns in turn occurred because of a lack of parts to fix them.  
Russia was now demanding payment for its goods and services, and Syria did not have 
the funds to pay.  What funds the state did have were being directed into programs that 
would prevent unrest among the population.  
b.         Equipment 
The Syrian Air Force was composed of Soviet aircraft.  This section 
measures combat aircraft only because offensive capabilities better illustrate the 
imbalance of forces between Israel and Syria, and the resulting potential for conflict.  The 
Syrians were equipped with air tankers, air cargo and transport planes as well.  The 
numbers (see Appendix Five) illustrate that not only are the Syrian aircraft aging, but 
                                                 
32 Collelo, p. 259. 
33 Ibid. p. 259. 
34 Heller and Shapir, p. 362. 
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there is a serious shortage of parts to maintain the current inventory properly.  This 
situation will cripple the Syrians if they become involved in any aggressive action against 
the Israelis. 
c.         Training 
Training is a moot point for discussion. Syrian officers attend the Air 
Force Academy, but any further training is limited by the lack of funds for machinery and 
fuel.  The 1980s saw many young Syrian pilots training in the Soviet Union.  Those days 
have passed, and now pilots are lucky if they fly fifteen hours a month. 
 
D.  MILITARY ANALYSIS 
The evidence shows that Israel’s military is vastly superior to that of the Syrians.  
The only arena in which the Syrians hold a slight advantage is the number of active duty 
army personnel.  That aside, however, the Israeli navy and air force far exceed the Syrian 
navy and air force in strength and firepower.  In all areas, the IDF has a tremendous 
qualitative advantage in equipment, machinery and munitions. 
 Going by the numbers, Syria’s larger army gives it a first strike advantage. If the 
Syrians mounted a swift, accurate and relentless first strike, there is a possibility that the 
Israeli army would not be able to recover. If, however, the Israelis were able to defend 
and hold the line against a first strike, then Israel’s well-equipped and well-trained 
reserve forces probably would decimate the Syrians.  The Israeli reserves outnumber the 
Syrians almost three to one, giving them, in total numbers (active duty and reserves), a 
1.3 to 1 advantage over the Syrians.  
 Israel possesses a further advantage in equipment.  The bulk of the equipment 
used by Israel originates from the West, primarily the United States.  Western weaponry 
has proven generally to be highly reliable.  In contrast, Syria’s reliance on Soviet 
manufactured goods has been ill-fated.  The collapse of the USSR forced client states 
such as Syria to pay for Russian goods before they are shipped. This includes spare parts 
as well as new equipment.  Because the Syrian economy is not robust, available funds 
generally bypass the military in order to finance programs that prevent civil unrest. 
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 From this discussion it becomes clear that there is a direct link between the 
strength of the Syrian economy and the strength of Syria’s military.  The Israeli economy 
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III.  ECONOMIC POWER 
Where governments lack legitimacy because of corruption, repression, or 
incompetence, civil conflict can erupt.  Where countries experiencing such 
economic and social stresses are further characterized by ethnic, religious, 
or regional fragmentation, where some groups feel they have no political 
voice, and where discontented groups can now gain easy access to 
information that elucidates their comparative deprivation, contact other 
discontented groups, and even purchase arms to further their goals, all 
from the internet, the probability of conflict may be greater than at any 
time in the past.35 
 
Chapter III examines the economic balance of power between Israel and Syria.  
After examining the evidence that such an imbalance exists, the chapter then seeks to 
answer the question, How does this imbalance affect regional stability and security in the 
Levant?  Carol Lancaster, in her article “Developing Countries: Winners or Losers?” 
states that conflict and insecurity are a result of severe economic volatility.36  When a 
state’s economy is robust, the likelihood of instability leading to conflict is low, but a 
stagnant economy increases the probability of unrest within states.  This chapter 
concludes that the imbalance of economic power between Israel and Syria has fostered 
political instability in the region.  The article, “The Price of Peace,” in the Wall Street 
Journal supports this paper’s thesis that violence is a response to an economy that is 
failing or is far weaker than surrounding states.  Further lending to support such a failing 
economy only exacerbates the chance for conflict.37  The likelihood of instability 
increases because if a discord between a government and the populace exists, an 
expedient method to refocus the discord is to attack neighboring states and blame the 
economic turmoil on that nation.   
                                                 
35 Lancaster, C., “Developing Countries: Winners or Losers?,” in Kugler, R. and Frost, E., The Global 
Century, Globalization and National Security, NDU Press, 2001, p. 660.  
36 Lancaster, p. 660. 
37 Holmes, K. R., O’Driscoll, G. P., O’Grady, M. A., “The Price of Peace,” Wall Street Journal 
Commentary section, November 12, 2001, http://www.WSJ.com. 
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Because state economies follow a cyclical pattern of growth and recession over 
time, this chapter will focus only on the last fifteen years. Israel’s economy, until 
recently, has been flourishing, primarily because of revenue generated by growth in 
tourism, robust and increasing foreign capital investment, and the development of a high 
technology industry.  The Syrian economy by contrast has generally suffered high 
inflation, poor exchange rates and a lack of foreign investment since the 1970s, as a result 
of harsh private sector reforms enacted by President Hafiz al-Asad.  These policies led to 
a mass exodus of capital from within Syria, as well the drying up of foreign investment.  
Moreover, the Syrian economy is reliant upon external rents to maintain growth.  This 
economic imbalance between the two states has increased regional instability and raised 
security concerns between Syria and Israel.  The result has been violence ranging from 
war, in 1967 and 1973, to recent acts of terrorism.  
This chapter is divided into two sections.  The first section examines the current 
state of the Israeli economy by focusing on three indicators: gross national product 
(GNP), growth over the period in question, and the percentage of GNP generated by the 
“high technology” sector.  The evidence will show that the Israeli economy has grown 
consistently over the past fifteen years; the only setbacks have been a direct result of 
violence, most notably the Palestinian intifadas.   
The second section of the chapter focuses on the Syrian economy.  An 
examination of Syrian GNP, growth and high technology as a percentage of GNP reveals 
that the Syrians are far behind the Israelis.  While the Syrian economy has experienced 
growth spurts over the fifteen years in question, the economy overall has been weak and 
unable to maintain growth without assistance from outside sources.  In addition, the 
section examines the impact of the rentier structure on the Syrian economy. The rentier 
structure is designed so that the government receives the majority of revenue and then 
dispurses to the public.  Moreover, this structure relies on complacency and apathy from 
the populace.  In other words, there is very little public involvement within the 
government.  The evidence demonstrates that the Syrian economy risks constant collapse, 
thus exacerbating existing security problems in the region. 
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A. THE ISRAELI ECONOMY 
The three parts of this section, GNP, growth and percentage of GNP contributed 
by high technology, use data from the period 1985 to the present.  I preface this analysis 
with a brief history of Israeli economic trends and the policies that led to the country’s 
present prosperity.  The part on GNP includes the 1985 Economic Stabilization Plan and 
the impact of taxation on the economy. I use high technology as an indicator of economic 
health because the proportion of GNP generated from new technology is a measure of the 
economy’s level of modernization. In other words, a modern economy tends to gain 
revenue from technology exports.  
1.   GNP and Economic Stabilization 
From 1973 to 1988, the growth of Israel’s GNP declined to approximately two 
percent per annum. This was a dramatic downturn from the remarkable growth the 
economy had experienced in its first thirty-four years of existence.  Inflation began to 
soar, from single digits to over 445 percent.38  By the early 1980s, the government 
realized it needed to act, and instituted what was known as the Economic Stabilization 
Program of July 1985.  In a departure from other analysts, I contend that the so-called 
third economic period starts from the inception of this program, which introduced a 
period of recovery and eventual primacy in the region.  
Israel’s gross national product reached an all-time low in 1985, and the country 
was on the verge of bankruptcy.  This crisis prompted government officials to formulate 
the Economic Stabilization Program, which they hoped would be a solution.  Michael 
Shalev cites Bichler and Nitzan, who suggested that it was time for Israel to adopt a more 
outward looking economic strategy.39 Furthermore, according to Gringberg, the mid-
1980s were an especially favorable period for radical economic reform.40  The 
stabilization program consisted of five measures. First, it devalued the over-inflated 
exchange rate by 18.8 percent, and froze the exchange rate at NIS1.50 to $1.00, thus 
                                                 
38 Shalev, p. 141. 
39 Ibid. p. 140. 
40 Ibid. p. 134. 
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allowing for normal market fluctuation.41  Second, domestic commodity prices were 
raised then frozen, this was an attempt to generate consumer spending.  Third, the 
program decreased subsidies and increased taxes.  Fourth, the cost-of living-allowance 
was suspended.  The fifth and final step in economic reform was restricting the economy 
so that Israel was not dependant upon the state for revenue.   
At first, the Economic Stabilization Program had an adverse impact, as it lowered 
actual income.  The Israeli government, however, was taking a long-term view, and in 
time the economy began to turn around.  Moreover, the engineers of the plan saw the 
crisis as an opportunity to devise a strategic reorientation of economic policy.42  This 
reorientation was designed to make the economy self-reliant and to build a solid revenue 
base.  While restrictive at first, Israel’s economic policy paid off, and by the end of 1986 
the government removed the majority of state-imposed restrictions.  From that point, the 
economy steadily moved forward (see Figure One below).43  Israel’s GNP slowly gained 
ground through the last half of the 1980s, going from roughly $48 billion, in 1985, to just 
under $58 billion in 1989.44 
Figure One, 1985-1989 GNP in $ millions 
  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
Israel  49,015  51,579  55,483  56,988  57,485  
 
 The 1990s started where the preceding decade left off, with a growing economy, 
as Figure Two illustrates.  GNP continued to increase from $67 billion in 1990 to $99 
billion by 1999.45  This dramatic recovery illustrates how a strong government and sound 
economic policies were able to bring the country through hardship and turmoil. This 
                                                 
41 Ibid.  p. 173. 
42 Keren, M., “Economists and Economic Policy Making in Israel: The Politics of Expertise in the 
Stabilization Program,” Policy Sciences, Volume 26, 1993, p. 331. 
43 Metz, p. 174. 
44 This data extracted from the World Bank’s Developing Country Indices; a CD-rom containing 
country data and statistics the data was compiled in 1999.   https://www.worldbank.org. 
 
45 Refer to the World Bank web site https://www.worldbank.org for the data after 1997. 
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upswing has only recently slumped since Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat’s 
declaration of the second intifada (a violent uprising against Israeli rule in the territories 
occupied by Israel since 1973.  According to Shalev, “In the course of the 1990s, the 
economy experienced a wave of growth that was comparable in pace to the Asian tigers 
and brought average living standards within reach of the rich OECD democracies.”46  
Figure Two, 1990-1998 GNP in $ millions 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  
Israel  61,524 66,609 70,258 74,467 79,711 84,825 88,514 90,200 98,512  
 
2.  Taxation 
  The stabilization plan of 1985, however, was only one factor that spurred GNP in 
the 1980s.  Changes in taxation policy were another important aspect of strong economic 
growth.  This policy separates the Israeli experience from that of the Asian “paper tigers.”  
From 1982 to 1984 Israel was running a budget deficit between 12 and 15 percent of 
GNP.  After implementation of the Economic Stabilization Plan, the budget was 
balanced.  The primary reason for this turnaround was the raising of taxes.  Initially, the 
Israeli tax system was similar to that of a rentier state.  The state relied on aid and other 
rents to meet the balance of payments rather than levying taxes on personal income.  The 
aid that Israel has relied upon to boost the economy primarily came from the United 
States.  Moreover, this aid supplemented the Israeli economy to allow the economic 
statbilization plan of 1985 to work.  Even with the influx of aid coming from America, 
the economy needed a bigger effort from the Israelis.  Therfore, by fiscal year (FY) 1986, 
however, the rate of taxation had gone from 35 percent to a combined 57 percent GNP:  
33 percent from income tax, 20 percent value added tax and customs duties generating 
another four percent.47  (See Figure Three below.)  Reduced spending in turn decreased 
                                                 
46 Shalev, M., “Liberalization and the Transformation of the Political Economy,” in The New Israel: 
Peacemaking and Liberalization, Shafir, G. & Yoav, P. et. al., Westview Press, 2000, p. 129. 
47 Metz, p. 154. 
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inflation, which also helped raise the GNP.  In short, the Israeli government entered a 
period of “state contraction.”48 
Figure Three, 1985-1989 Tax Revenue (% of GDP)49 
  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
Israel  44.86  42.38  40.17  36.78  34.46  
 
 Figure Four shows a lower rate of taxation in the 1990s than in the last half of the 
1980s.  This came about because the economy was growing and state revenue was being 
generated from other sources (i.e., agriculture, high technology sales, state grants and 
loans), freeing the government from its heavy reliance on taxes as a source of funding.  
While steady economic growth was due in part to the high tax rate of the 1980s, the 
strong economy eventually permitted the government to lower taxes.  Tax cuts in turn 
further added to economic growth by boosting retail spending. 
Figure Four, 1990-1998 Tax Revenue (% of GDP)50 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  
Israel  33.73 25.20 33.30 33.82 34.47 35.35 34.65 35.58 36.62  
            Although according to the figures above the tax burden appears to be onerous for 
Israel’s citizens, at this time the government began to re-incorporate business taxes into 
the revenue stream.  This was one immediate effect of the stabilization program, as well 
as the reduction of the tax rate on undistributed profits from an “internationally high level 
of 61 percent in 1984 to the rich-country norm (only 36 percent) in 1996.”51  The ability 
to decrease taxes signals stability in the state and a prosperous economy.  Furthermore, 
the ability of the government to extract a sizeable amount of revenue from taxes provides 
an economic “crutch” in case other sources of revenue begin to diminish. 
Another reason for the rise in GNP was state contraction--in this case a reduction 
of the welfare state.  This can be seen as a move towards a more even division of labor 
                                                 
48 Shalev, p. 134. 
49 World Bank CD-rom, 1999. 
50 World Bank CD-rom, 1999. 
51 Shalev, p. 135. 
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between the state and private industry.52  Logically, a retraction of government 
entitlements and subsidies would be matched by an increase in the importance and 
competitiveness of domestic markets.  In the case of Israel, Shalev notes: 
The decline since the mid-1980s in the share of national resources 
distributed by the Israelis is quite remarkable.  Total public expenditure 
had been equivalent to at least three-quarters of the national product since 
the 1973 war.  Nevertheless, two years after stabilization the figure fell to 
62 percent and by 1994 it had troughed at only 54 percent.  Almost all a 
decline in government spending….53  
The reduction in subsidies reaped dividends for Israel.  High government spending in the 
1970s led to recession in the early 1980s.  As spending moved from the government to 
private industry in the form of capital investment and wages, workers’ incomes began to 
increase, which in turn spurred retail spending and the economy as a whole.  The result of 
taxation and state contraction was the reversal of the recession in the mid-1980s, 
followed by tremendous growth in the 1990s. 
3.  Growth 
One means to determine the strength of a state’s economy is by plotting its trends 
over time on a graph.  This will yield a curving line called the “growth curve.”54   In 
general, a state with a positive curve is a strong state.  Another means to determine 
economic strength is the source of state revenue.  If a state receives the majority of its 
revenue from external sources (rents), then no matter how much growth the economy 
exhibits it will remain inherently weak.  A state economy dependent for a large 
percentage of its income on rents is dependant upon the economies of other nations.  If 
for any reason these rents diminish or cease altogether, the dependant nation’s 
government will begin to suffer unrest and loss of support as its populace is forced to 
bridge the revenue gap normally filled by rents.  
                                                 
52 Ibid. p. 134. 
53 Shalev, p. 134.  Data obtained was from a comparison of two five year periods, (1980-1984) & 
(1992-1996); the source was BOI-96, Appendix Table Hay-la. 
54 The “curve” refers to the graph used to illustrate rates of growth. A strong state will typically 
average a positive (upswinging) curve while a weak country will have a negative (downswinging) curve. 
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Studies have determined that a stable economy will show annual growth ranging 
from two to six percent above population growth.55  Growth above two percent, however, 
does not in itself indicate a stable government.  By contrast, a thriving state may 
experience moments in which the growth rate falls under the two percent mark, as did the 
United States during the 1980s.  This decade was marked by recession, but the 
government remained stable.  A state on the brink of collapse nevertheless could exhibit 
tremendous growth, as did Iran in 1978 prior to the Iranian revolution.  Only massive 
economic aid from the United States gave the tottering government of Reza Shah Pahlavi 
the appearance of stability. 
 Israel’s growth rate from 1961 to 1972 was roughly ten percent per annum.56  
Between 1972 and 1985, growth slumped to a relatively stagnant three percent. The 
Economic Stabilization act of 1985 began to reverse the declining growth rate (see Figure 
Five), but the last half of the 1980s was a turbulent time for the Israeli economy.  The 
introduction of new reforms and the withdrawal of government regulations from many 
aspects of business brought about severe fluctuations in annum growth over the 
remainder of the decade, averaging one percent. This may not seem drastic given that two 
percent growth is still considered an acceptable rate of growth.  The test for the Israeli 
government, however, was its ability to push through radical economic reforms and 
remain stable during the ensuing adjustments.  
Figure Five, 1985-1989 % Growth 
  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
Israel  3.9085  5.2306  7.5694  2.7133  0.8238  
Figure Five is the growth by percentage that each economy exhibited annually for the last half of the 1980s.57 
 The 1990s brought amazing prosperity to Israel.  Most of the reforms enacted in 
the mid-1980s gradually were revoked as the economy continued to grow (see Figure 
                                                 
55 From author interview with Robert E. Looney, Economist and Professor at the Naval Postgraduate 
School.   
56 Metz, p. 144. 
57 World Bank CD-Rom, 1999. 
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Six). By the final stage of the stabilization plan in the mid-1990s, Israel’s economic 
growth was averaging approximately 8.6 percent.58 
Figure Six, 1990-1997 % Growth 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  
Israel  7.0769 8.2642 5.4797 5.9897 7.0422 6.4163 4.3489 1.9043  
Figure Six is the growth by percentage that each economy exhibited annually for the 1990s.59 
 The ruling Labor Party’s successful conclusion of a peace treaty with Jordan, 
signed in 1994, contributed to the prosperity of both countries.  By opening up Israel’s 
economy to neighboring states, policymakers increased avenues for economic growth 
through trade.  The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in 1995, however, 
precipitated an economic slowdown that continues today (Figure Six).60  Nevertheless, 
despite the political and economic turbulence that Israel has experienced over the past 
fifteen years, growth has remained positive. 
4. High Technology 
Israel has led the region in developing its high technology industries.61    As well 
as being an indicator of a progressive economy, technology is also a leading force on the 
world market.  Globalization through media such as the Internet, global 
telecommunications, and video teleconferencing has meant that economies must adjust to 
new market conditions or be left behind.  Approximately 22 percent of Israel’s GNP in 
the 1980s came from technology exports (see Figure Seven).62 
 Figure Seven, 1985-1989 % of high technology 63 
  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
Israel  23.9  21.9  22.7  25.8  26.1  
                                                 
58 This percent was the average of the growth for 1990-1996. 
59 World Bank CD-Rom, 1999. 
60 Ram, U., “The Promise Land of Business Opportunities: Liberal Post-Zionism in the Global Age,” 
Shafir, G. & Yoav, P., et. al., The New Israel: Peacemaking and Liberalization, Westview Press, 2000, p. 
228. 
61 http://www.photius.com. 
62 Refer to the World Bank’s: Developing Countries Indices 1999.  Also refer to figure nine which 
shows the average of the last half of the 1980s is 22 percent.  
63 World Bank CD-Rom, 1999. 
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This percentage continued to grow throughout the 1990s (see Figure Eight 
below).  The data reveils that Israel has developed a strong modern economy that 
generates a sizeable proportion of GNP from the high technology sector.  This modern 
economy enables Israel to be less reliable on foreign aid and more indipendant.  
Figure Eight, 1990-1997 % of high technology 64 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  
Israel  26.4 27.6 24.9 25.3 25.1 27.8 30.2 33.1  
 These exports have produced revenue in the billions of dollars (see Figure Nine 
below), and the world market for high-tech products continues to grow. 
Figure Nine 1985-1989 high tech exports in millions of dollars65 
  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
Israel  1246.4  1329.7  1648.3  2161.5  2439.9  
 
It therefore can be expected to be a reliable source of income for Israel into the 
foreseeable future. The high technology market is another area in which Israel has 
widened the economic gap with Syria. World Bank charts further support the notion that 
the Israeli economy is more modern than the relatively traditional economy of Syria.  The 
ability of the Israelis to exploit this revenue source will continue to widen economic gap 
in the future (see Figure Ten). 
Figure Ten, 1990-1997 high tech exports in millions of dollars66 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  




                                                 
64 World Bank CD-Rom, 1999. 
65 World Bank CD-Rom; 1999. 
66 Ibid. 
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B.        THE SYRIAN ECONOMY 
Over the last fifteen years, the Israeli economy has exhibited resilience and the 
ability to overcome economic crises.  In contrast, the Syrian economy has not had the 
success of the Israeli economy.  This section examines the Syrian economy through GNP, 
growth and the percent of high technology that comprises GNP.  The lack of high-tech 
industries is one hallmark of Syria’s relatively traditional economy, one that relies on 
agriculture and foreign aid rather than innovative enterprise to generate revenue.  
1. GNP 
Unlike Israel, Syrian GNP has not fared well.  From its independence in 1946 
through the mid-1960s, the Syrian economy was entirely agrarian.67  Thus, growth was 
slow and depended on the vagaries of rainfall and crop yield.  A revolution in 1963, 
brought the Ba’th Party to power and installed a socialist government in Syria.68  The 
new government introduced reforms to expand the public sector, provide subsidies for 
agriculture, and impose limitations on the private sector.  The government also seized 
production of strategic minerals as part of its program to nationalize key industries.69  
During this period, Syria hemorrhaged skilled workers, experienced administrators and 
capital, which had a negative effect on GNP during the decade of the 1960s.70  
The 1970s brought another revolution and the rise of Hafiz al-Asad to power.  
Asad was discontent with the direction of the Ba’th party.  Asad’s dynasty trumped 
democracy when his son assumed the presidency upon Asad’s death in 2000.  The 
economy, ironically enough, flourished during Asad’s rule, mostly because oil prices 
were unusually high due to the OPEC oil embargo that began in 1973.  Syria and other 
OPEC members reaped a (temporary) financial windfall.  Remittance from Syrian 
workers in the oil fields of neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq 
further bolstered the Syrian economy during this period.71  The relatively high standard 
of living that Syrians began to enjoy would last only to the end of the 1970s.  Even 
                                                 
67 Metz, p. 109.  
68 Ibid, p. 109. 
69 These were minerals such as oil and phosphates. 
70 Metz, p. 109. 
71 Ibid, p. 109. 
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though the country seemed to have a booming economy, the fact remained that Syria was 
dependant on foreign aid, primarily from Saudi Arabia (money) and the Soviet Union 
(military aid), and on revenue generated from the export of raw materials, to keep it 
solvent.  
    By the mid-1980s, the Syrian economy had gone from relative prosperity to 
austerity.72  This was due to a sharp decline in oil prices, a huge disparity in the country’s 
balance of payments, and a decline in foreign capital aid and investments because of 
Syria’s support for Iran in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. The government’s excessive 
reliance on foreign aid and oil revenues, combined with the country’s inadequately 
developed industrial sector, contributed to the sharp economic decline.  The already weak 
industrial sector further suffered from a chronic shortage of electrical capacity.   
Figure Eleven, Syrian GNP/year for 1985-198973  (in $millions) 
  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
Syria  10,929  10,357  10,266  11,596  10.176  
A comparison of Figure One with Figure Eleven shows that over the last half of 
the 1980s the Syrian economy was barely one-fifth the size of Israel’s economy.  The 
1990s however, were a new era for the Syrian economy.  GNP grew to a steady $15 
billion or so (see Figure Twelve), thanks to improved relations with the Saudi 
government, a result in turn of Syrian support for the allies in the 1991 Gulf War against 
Iraq.   Syria also benefited at this time from so-called “windfall rents,” revenue that is 
short-lived and generally is not a lasting commodity (e.g., war reparations, high crop 
yield or high state-to-state grants).74  
Figure Twelve, Syrian GNP/year for 1990-199775  (in $millions) 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  
Syria  11,066 11,910 12,977 13,884 14,941 15,855 16,357 19,944  
                                                 
72 Ibid, p. 110. 
73 World Bank CD-Rom; 1999. 
74 Robinson, Glenn E., “Elite Cohesion, Regime Succession and Political Instability in Syria,” Middle 
East Policy, V/4 January 1998. 
75 World Bank, 1999. 
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In 1991, the Asad government put into effect the so-called “Law 10.”  This law 
attempted to open the Syrian economy to foreign investment and sought to revitalize the 
private sector.  On the surface, Law 10 looked like the beginning of real economic 
reform.  In truth, however, the new law turned out to be a defensive reaction toward 
instability within the ruling regime.76 
2. Taxation 
Figure Thirteen shows that the percent of Syria’s state revenue generated by taxes 
is roughly 20 percent, which is relatively low compared with Israel.  This percentage 
should generate concern, because if the state’s primary sources of revenue--oil and 
foreign aid--decrease or disappear as happened in the 1980s, then the economy once 
again will be in shambles. A diverse state economic structure, with revenue flows from 
multiple sources, is more able to cope with economic hardship than one like Syria’s, that 
depends on only one or two revenue streams. 
Figure Thirteen, 1985-1989 Percentage of GDP from Taxes 
  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
Syria  0.0  12.8  14.899  14.345  17.129  
 
 Syria’s tax revenues come mostly from imports and foreign investment.  There 
are little or no income taxes, and what little taxes do come from workers are in the form 
of remittance from laborers who work in other countries (see Figure Fourteen). 
Inadequate tax revenue is yet another reason the Syrian state does not handle fiscal crises 
well, and growth stays to a minimum. 
Figure Fourteen 1990-1997 Percentage of GDP from Taxes 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  
Syria  16.71 18.09 19.40 17.46 17.47 18.68 16.50 16.40  
 
 
                                                 
76 For an in-depth examination of defensive reforms see, Robinson, p. 168. See also Robinson, 




On the face of it, the Syrian economy is comparable to Israel’s in growth over 
time.  The test, however, lies with the curve in the growth of GNP and the origins of state 
revenue.  If, for instance, the curve is negative or the sources of revenues are unstable 
then the actual growth becomes more detrimental then helpful.  The Syrian economy’s 
growth over the fifteen-year period this study deals with has been sporadic at best.  The 
economic improvements of the 1990s brought about by increases in foreign aid, 
unusually high crop yields and a good oil market, were the result of good fortune, not 
good economic planning (see Figure Fifteen).  Despite having a lot more money, the 
Syrian economy essentially was in the same position it was in the beginning of the 1980s. 
Figure Fifteen, Percent Growth in Syrian GNP 1990-1997 77 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  
Syria  8.7434 7.6329 8.9574 6.9851 7.6148 6.1192 3.167 3.5893  
   
   The years 1985 and 1988 saw positive growth in the Syrian economy only 
because rents were plentiful.  On the other hand, growth over the last half of the 1980s 
was flat (see Figure Sixteen).78  When revenues from foreign aid and remittances dried 
up, the Syrian government was thrust into a position where it needed to open the 
economy to private business or risk internal strife.79  Law 10, formulated to meet this 
crisis, instituted a grace period to entice wealthy Syrian elites to return and invest in their 
country, and to attract foreign businesses to invest in Syria.  
Figure Sixteen, Percent Growth in Syrian GNP 1985-1989 80 
  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
Syria  6.0501  -5.235  -0.875  12.953  -12.24  
                                                 
77 World Bank CD-Rom; 1999. 
78 For further insight, see Drysdale and Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, 
Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1999, also see Robinson; “Elite Cohesion, Regime Succession and 
Political Instability in Syria,” Middle East Policy, V/4, January, 1998. 
79 Robinson, p. 161. 
80 World Bank CD-Rom; 1999. 
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4. High Technology 
Syria has no high technology industry to speak of.  During the 1980s, revenue-
generating exports of high technology peaked at six percent of Syria’s total exports (see 
Figure Seventeen).   
Figure Seventeen, Percent of Syrian exports that are high technology 1985-198981 
  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
Syria  6.14  1.6236  1.3978  0.0  5.994  
State revenue during this period peaked at $1.2 billion (see Figure Eighteen).  
These figures are in stark contrast to Israel’s well-developed high-tech sector, and are 
comparable to any under-developed economy. 
Figure Eighteen 1985-1989 high tech exports $millions82 
  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  
Syria  12.19  8.19  5.88  0.0  7.9  
 
Despite the growth in state revenues for the period, the 1990s actually saw a decline in 
Syria’s high technology sector, to the point where it contributed nothing to the export 
market.  Besides highlighting the traditional economy that Syria still relies on, the data 
further suggest that there is a vast economic imbalance of power between Syria and Israel 
(see Figures Nineteen and Twenty below).   
Figure Nineteen, Percent of Syrian exports that are high technology 1990-199783 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997   
Syria  2.6376 0.0 0.8011 0.0 0.0 0.8946 0.0 0.0   
Figure Twenty, 1990-1997 high tech exports $millions84 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  
Syria  39.64 0.0 2.28 0.0 0.0 6.19 0.0 0.0  
 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 




5. The Rentier Structure 
The rentier economy is one structured so that the state receives the overwhelming 
bulk of its revenue from outside sources such as natural resource sales and foreign policy 
sales.85  The inherent weakness of this system is that money flow is unidirectional.  In 
other words, payment is made directly to the state and then the state directs the flow of 
money to the populace. The state’s citizens do not have any economic interaction with 
their government other than to receive whatever it directs their way.  Limiting 
government participation to a select elite works until a fiscal crisis occurs and the 
government is forced to attempt some quick reforms in order to stay in power.  As with 
Law 10, the result rarely brings more that a temporary, superficial benefit.86 
  Syria’s rentier structure is inherently weak.  The Asad government’s reliance on 
aid and oil to maintain revenues and a positive GNP severely hindered a real deepening 
of the industrial base and the foreign investment needed to develop a strong market 
economy.  Furthermore, an unengaged, government-supported populace becomes 
complacent and unable to innovate.   
Nor does the rentier structure provide the capability to cope with an economic 
crisis. If the rents cease then the government is forced to extract revenue from other 
sources, generally through some form of taxation.  As a result, the dependent population 
becomes enraged because their quality of life is deteriorating.  They begin to push for 
change, resulting in civil unrest and government crackdowns. 
 
C.        ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
The Levant today is a notoriously unstable region with profound security 
concerns.  Using three indicators over the period 1985-1997--GNP, growth and the 
percentage high tech exports contribute to GNP--this paper seeks to demonstrate that the 
                                                 
85 As is the case with Jordan. 
86 For more information on the rentier structure see; Giacomo Luciani’s, The Oil Rent, the Fiscal 
Crisis of the State and Democratization,or Chaudhry’s The Price of Wealth: Business and State in Labor 
Remittance and Oil Economies. 
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economic imbalance between Israel and Syria is one important factor that has adversely 
affected the stability and security of the region.  
The data presented in the preceding section show that Israel’s GNP, over the 
period in question, was approximately five times that of Syria.  Translated into raw 
purchasing power, this gap meant that Israelis enjoyed a better quality of life, and that the 
state of Israel was able to take advantage of vast resources available on the world market.  
In contrast, the Syrian economy during this same period remained dependant on outside 
resources such as foreign aid to meet state needs, which in turn curtailed the Syrian’s 
government’s ability to take advantage of markets.  The GNP of both nations was further 
impacted by their respective systems of taxation.  A state such as Israel that derives a 
majority of its revenue from taxation has a greater ability to withstand economic 
downturns than one such as Syria that relies on such volatile revenue sources as raw 
material exports, aid and agriculture.  Israel’s 1985 Economic Stabilization plan shifted 
the Israeli economy from a socialist to a more market friendly form with a broad tax base.  
If Syria’s government had attempted to introduce such reforms, it probably would have 
instigated a coup d’ etat.  
A comparison of the economic growth in both countries over the fifteen-year 
period illustrates two points.  First, the Israeli economy was strong and able to maintain 
steady growth throughout the entire period primarily because it was self-sustaining.  
Israel was able to maintain growth and keep unemployment at a low rate.  Israel’s ability 
to be self-sustaining came from strong industrial production, a high technological market 
and limited reliance on state-to-state revenue. The strategic rents that Israel received from 
the United States during this time were an important factor that aided the Israeli 
economy’s fast recovery through the last half of the 1980s.  Furthermore, the aid 
provided enough relief so that Israel could move towards a self-sustaining economy. 
Second, rate of growth by itself is not a reliable gauge of economic health.  On the 
surface, for example, the Syrian economy outgrew the Israeli economy throughout the 
1990s, but a closer look reveals that Syria’s apparent growth came from strategic rents, 
not from increased production.  While the growth rate took a phenomenal upswing during 
the 1990s, Syria’s GNP actually grew only slightly.   
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Third, it is readily apparent that revenue from Israel’s well-established high-tech 
industry far surpassed that of Syria over the period of study. This income alone generated 
roughly 25 percent of Israel’s GNP in the 1990s.  By contrast, Syria’s high-tech export 
market is non-existent. Syria’s inability to develop new industries also has inhibited its 
economy from becoming self-reliant, further exacerbating the economic imbalance 
between the two nations.  Raw data from the World Bank depict a huge disparity between 
the two countries’ relative wealth.  If Syria hopes to compete with the economic power of 
Israel or any other developed nation, the Syrian government’s reliance on rents must 
cease.  Syrian leaders must reform their economy to encourage industries that are able to 
produce revenue, rather than continuing to rely on money given by other nations.  
Increasing self-reliance will promote competition, which in turn, promotes industrial 
expansion.  Industrial growth lowers unemployment and increases tax revenues, which 
give the state the flexibility to implement reforms and improve infrastructure.  A stable 
and prosperous Syria will be able to close the economic gap with Israel and contribute to 



















IV. THE LINK TO BALANCE OF POWER 
Chapter IV applies the theory of balance of power to explain why relations 
between Syria and Israel tend to reflect instability and heightened insecurity.   Up to now, 
balance of power arguments have not been applied to the turmoil between Syria and 
Israel, and should produce a fresh and parsimonious explanation of the trouble in the 
Levant. 
This chapter is divided into three sections.  First, I define balance of power theory 
by synthesizing works by Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, and Partha 
Chatterjee.  These authors’ ideas provide sound criteria by which to judge whether 
balancing exists, and a working model of the theory that can be applied to the countries 
of the Levant.  Second, I use three case studies to illustrate how balance of power 
manifests in specific instances:  Napoleonic France, which dominated Europe in the early 
19th century until Russia and Great Britain rose against it; South Africa’s preponderance 
of power in the southern region of Africa; and the Cold War standoff between the United 
States and the Soviet Union.  Although relations between the two superpowers sometimes 
brought them close to war, the two nations never fought each other.  Balance of power 
theory suggests that the Cold War remained cold because neither of the two enjoyed a 
preponderance of power.  Therefore I conclude that a balance is needed between Syria 
and Israel in order for them to coexist in peace.  
The final section in this chapter applies balance of power theory to the Levant. 
This section will describe the severe imbalance that persists between Syria and Israel and 
show how this imbalance contributes to the instability that presently dominates the 
Levant.  Until this imbalance is addressed by the world community, prospects for peace 
will remain limited.  
A. BALANCE OF POWER DEFINED 
For the purposes of this thesis, I draw my definition of balance of power primarily 
from Emerson M.S. Niou’s and Peter C. Ordeshook’s A Theory of the Balance of Power 
in International Systems.   This work postulates that balance of power, and therefore, 
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stability, is dependant upon system and resource stability.  The authors present a model I 
use to show that military power and economic strength are the two primary factors that 
must be balanced to achieve stability.  To supplement Niou’s and Ordeshook’s 
arguments, I draw upon Partha Chatterjee’s The Classical Balance of Power.  Together, 
these works provide a comprehensive and useful explanation of balance of power theory. 
Niou and Ordeshook argue that the understanding of balance of power has 
become muddled over time, and that a more lean and concise model was needed.  They 
concluded that balance of power was based on the notion of system and resource 
stability, as described in the introduction to their book: 
Attempts at incorporating the assumption that national leaders pursue 
clearly defined objectives, and at applying the theory of cooperative 
games to the analysis of international systems, have led to little success in 
formalizing the concept of balance of power, and in providing theoretical 
justification for much of the scholarly intuition about this concept.  But by 
assuming that such leaders temper their desire to maximize resources by 
the goal of ensuring the survival of their countries, and by distinguishing 
between two forms of stability-one in which no nation’s existence is 
threatened and one in which no nation’s resources are threatened-we offer 
a model that yields necessary and sufficient conditions for both forms of 
stability. 87 
In short, a strategic balance between nations is possible only when there is system 
and resource stability.  While the authors do not precisely define system and resource as 
military or economic means, I made this deduction based on the authors’ assumption that 
states seek to “maximize power and resources.”88  In order to maximize national power, 
it may be assumed that a nation needs a strong military as well as a robust economy.  
Moreover, without a strong economy, a nation will lack the resources to build a powerful 
military.  Weaker nations therefore will tend to form alliances in order to balance against 
the hegemon. 
                                                 
87 Niou, E. M.S. & Ordeshook, P. C., “A Theory of the Balance of Power in International Systems,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 1986, p. 685.  
88 Ibid. p. 687. 
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 To find a more clear definition of the terms “system and resource,” I turned to 
Partha Chatterjee’s The Classical Balance of Power.  Chatterjee provides the link that 
incorporates the military and economy into the balance of power model:   
The rulers of each of these nation-states are primarily concerned with 
preserving what they perceive to be their national interests, which 
presumably include such things as national identity, independence, 
territorial jurisdiction, power capabilities, etc.; and also with the furthering 
of those national interests, which implies suitable changes in national 
power capabilities.89  
Chatterjee further defines “national power capabilities” as military and economic means, 
most notably population, material resources, industrial capacity and armed forces.90 This 
definition offers not only a sufficient basis for comparison of the relative strengths of 
Syria and Israel, but also a means to disprove the theory.   One example of a nation with a 
weak military and moderate economy that has managed to survive is Switzerland. This 
example shows that military strength is not the key to stability, rather a flourishing 
economy is the key. 
 Before applying this concept to the Levant, one question needs to be addressed:  
is there any impact (negative or positive) to regional actors in the presence or absence of 
a balance of power?  After all, if a connection cannot be made between imbalances and 
conflict or a balanced system and stability, then there is no reason to take the discussion 
further. 
 
B.   BALANCE OF POWER CASE STUDIES 
This section uses three case studies, Napoleonic France, South Africa and the 
Cold War, to provide empirical data to support my thesis that instability between Syria 
and Israel is a function of balance of power. These studies will illustrate that when the 
military and economic strength of two nations are relatively balanced conflict is 
minimized, and when an imbalance pertains conflict will result.   
                                                 
89 Chatterjee, P., “The Classical Balance of Power Theory,” Journal of Peace Research, Volume 9, 
Issue 1, 1972, p. 52. 
90 Ibid. p. 52. 
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1. Napoleonic France 
The French revolution was a turning point not only for France and its people, but 
also for the security of Europe.  After Napoleon ascended to power, he began a military 
build-up that culminated in his 1812 march on Russia.  French domination of Europe 
lasted until Austria, Russia, and Germany could form a coalition capable of balancing 
against France and bringing to bear the military power needed to defeat Napoleon.   
 Napoleon’s France was able to become a regional hegemon by generating and 
borrowing enough wealth to raise an enormous, well-equipped army; this combination of 
treasure and force enabled Napoleon to conquer Europe.  While Napoleon was able to 
raise a moderate sum of money through taxation, he found he could not borrow what he 
needed except at high rates of interest.91  He increased the state’s revenues before war 
broke out only by establishing credibility through repayment of external debt.  Once the 
French exchequer had credibility, France was able to borrow from other nations at 
manageable interest rates.  This resource stability provided the means for Napoleon to 
begin a military build-up.  If he had chosen to settle for the status quo instead of conquest 
and domination, the other countries of Europe would have continued trading with France 
and allowed Napoleon to develop a defensive force for national security without 
challenge.  His ambitions, however, combined with the state’s increasing indebtedness, 
would inevitably lead to France’s economic collapse, a new balance of power and 
increasing stability within the region. 
Once war began, state funds decreased rapidly and the Directory, the ruling 
council of France under Napoleon, was forced to increases taxes in an attempt not only to 
fight the wars, but also to continue to borrow from other nations.  The attempt failed and 
France ultimately was defeated. Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, hampered by fierce 
resistance, a long supply chain and insufficient money, produced devastating results.  
Russia, Britain, Prussia, and the Hapsburg Empire eventually formed an alliance that was 
able  to balance against French power and quell Napoleon. 
                                                 
91 Bordo, M. D. and White, E. N., “A Tale of Two Currencies: British and French Finance During the 
Napoleonic Wars,”  The Journal of Economic History, Volume 51, Issue 2, June, 1991, p. 479. 
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a. Lessons Learned 
The Napoleonic wars demonstrate first of all that a state that possesses an 
excess of military might is perceived to threaten the sovereignty of other nations. A 
preponderance of military strength will be understood to exist only for the purpose of 
aggressive action against neighboring nations.  Second and more importantly, Napoleon’s 
rise illustrated the link between a strong military and a strong economy.  The French 
military only grew when the economy was robust.  When war started and the economy 
plummeted, Napoleon was forced to raise taxes in order to maintain his military force.  
The generation of taxes did not produce the desired result.  The end of wartime lending to 
France, coupled with extended supply lines to Russia, soon became too difficult to 
overcome.  
2. South Africa 
The second case that illustrates the link to my argument that an imbalance 
produces conflict is South African dominance of the lower African continent.  Until it 
began to make attempts at peaceful negotiations in 1984, Pretoria’s regional policy could 
most aptly be characterized as a policy of destabilization.92  In the words of Simon 
Jenkins: “The entire South African regional policy effort becomes collapsed into an 
attempt by Pretoria to inflict maximum material damage on the economies and social 
structures of regional states.”93  Why was South Africa able to dominate neighboring 
states with relative ease?  The answer again lies with the economy and military. 
The South African economy was far more developed than any of its neighbors.  
Its vast diamond industry relied on immigrant workers, as many as 300,000 in 1973.94  
As a result, other nations’ livelihood depended on the South African mining trade.  
Economic dominance was the first step for the South African government to establish its 
                                                 
92 Davies, R. and O’Mera, D., “Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African 
Regional Policy Since 1978,” Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 11, Issue 2, April, 1985, p. 184. 
93 Jenkins, S., “Destabilization in Southern Africa,” The Economist, Volume 16, Issue 7, 1983, cited in 
Davies and O’Mera, p. 184. 
94 Davies and O’Mera provide a list of cites that provide more detail on regional reliance of South 
African employment. Refer to S. Nolutshungu, “South Africa in Africa,” (Manchester, 1975); D. 
Geldenhuys and D. Venter, “Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: A Constellation of States?,” South 
African Institute of International Affairs Bulletin, December 1979, As cited in Davies and O’Mera, p. 186. 
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policy of destabilization.  The South African economy dominated the region, forcing its 
neighbors into reliance, cooperation and obedience.  If they failed to conform, they 
incurred military and economic punishment. 
While South Africa maintained a strong economic advantage, the government 
realized that a large military force would be necessary not only to defend the country, but 
to enforce foreign policy as well.  Therefore, by the mid-1970s, the military budget grew 
more than one and a half times over the previous year.95  The goal of the South African 
government was to have armed forces that could be used, so that when economic 
measures did not coerce neighboring countries to follow Pretoria’s wishes, force could be 
brought to bear.96  Peter Vale also discusses South Africa’s coercive foreign policy, 
although he focuses on developments since 1989.97  Furthermore, since the collapse of 
the Berlin Wall, little seems to change with respect to South African policy towards 
neighboring states.  The collapse of the Soviet Union, while it did not seem to change 
South Africa’s policy of regional dominance, did increase the level of difficulty the 
international community has influencing a land that is far from the mainstream of the 
“modern world.”  
a. Lessons Learned 
        There are two primary lessons to take from this case study:  first, that 
economic and military power are linked, and second, if one nation establishes hegemony, 
then it will try to coerce others through economic and military methods.  The South 
African case study shows that a nation that acquires a vast preponderance of power will 
use force (economic and military) in order to coerce neighboring states to be subservient 
to it.    
As with Napoleonic France, South Africa was able to build a military 
because its economy was robust.  The difference between the two case studies is that 
neighboring states in southern Africa are reliant on their migrant workers in South Africa 
to stimulate their own economies, whereas Napoleon had to improve France’s economy 
                                                 
95 Ibid. p. 188.  
96 Ibid. p. 198. 
97 Vale, P., “The Search For Southern Africa’s Security,” International Affairs, Volume 6, Issue 4, 
October 1991, p. 697. 
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after a revolution. By comparison, South Africa had a broader-based economy from 
which to develop a military.  Raw materials and diamonds were pivotal to South Africa’s 
flourishing economy.  A strong economy spurs the military growth that will enforce 
policy and coerce neighbors to align with a regional hegemon.   
3. The Cold War 
The final case study presented here is that of the Cold War (for the purposes of 
this study, 1945-1989).  The Cold War was based on a balance of power between the 
Soviet Union and the United States.  This example illustrates that stability is possible as 
long as a balance is maintained.  The two focal points for this case study will be to show 
the link between economic and military power, and how the two factors affect the 
stability of the international system.  I maintain that the Soviet Union and the United 
States never fought a war because there was a balance of power between them that 
preserved stability and prevented war.  
 During the period 1945-1989, the United States and the Soviet Union tried to 
discredit the other side’s form of government through economic and military means.  
Each side believed that it was necessary to possess the finest and most destructive 
military.  In order to accomplish this, they had to have the economic potential and 
strength to maintain the spending that a military of this magnitude would need. 
 I have already established that the military and the economy of a nation are 
linked.  The Cold War was no different.  The Soviets and the Americans were able to 
build their massive militaries because the economy of each nation was designed 
specifically to build a military. The USSR’s communist ideology was used to funnel vast 
state revenue into developing a deterrent force comparable to the American military, 
while social programs suffered.    
In contrast, the economy of the United States, while generally better than the 
Soviet economy, was constantly in a state of flux when it came to the amount of money 
spent on any one program, including the military.  The early 1980s were an economically 
difficult time for the country, so political leaders used inflammatory rhetoric to bolster 
popular support for increased military spending.  In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan 
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called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” in order to convince Congress to divert more 
money to military spending.98   
Why then, given the lack of trust between the two nations and their vast military 
power, did the Soviet Union and the United States never go to war directly with one 
another?  Simply put, they had created a stable balance of power.  Each nation wielded a 
tremendous arsenal in order to deter the other from attacking, a policy that became 
known as mutually assured destruction, or M.A.D.  This policy rested on the knowledge 
that if either side launched a preemptive strike, then the other side would retaliate with 
enough force to annihilate the aggressor.  Moreover, by the end of the Cold War, the 
world’s economies were becoming increasingly more interdependent.  Therefore, any 
destructive action taken by either side would have far greater impacts than coercion or 
simple destruction. 
a. Lessons Learned 
The Cold War is a valuable case study for the balance of power argument.  
The forty-four year period in which the two sides maintained relative military and 
economic parity was without direct conflict between the two nations.  Ironically, since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the level of conflict around the world has dramatically 
risen.  Some argue that the world is shifting toward multi-polarity, while others argue that 
the world has become unipolar, with several states that could be classed as second tier 
below the one remaining superpower.  The intent of this paper is not to argue either way, 
but to point out that the Cold War produced a stable environment, and that the reason for 
the stability was the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
The two superpowers based their power on a massive military structure on a strong 
economic base.   
The Soviet Union collapsed due to a failing economy.  This failing 
economy, in turn, led to the degradation of the Soviet military, proving again that there is 
a link between the economy and military might.  If a nation possesses the economic 
                                                 
98 George Lucas director of “Star Wars” coined the evil empire; President Ronald Regan adopted this 
phrase to refer to the Soviet Union.  Every time Reagan spoke publicly, this phrase was used to rally the 
public against the Soviet Union and the rest of the communist states.   
 47
capacity to maintain and build a strong military, then only two outcomes are possible:  it 
will become a hegemon or balance with another nation. 
 
C. APPLICATION TO THE LEVANT 
This chapter has defined balance of power and has provided three examples that 
illustrate the need for a balance of power in order to ensure peace.  How then does 
balance of power theory apply to the Levant?  Chapters one and two of this thesis 
presented data showing that Israel maintains a lop-sided advantage over Syria in 
economic power and in the size, capabilities and equipment of its armed forces.  
Furthermore, I have already established a positive link between a robust economy and a 
strong military.  These factors explain why violence in the region has been steadily 
increasing over the past fifteen years.   
1. Balance as a Function of the Economy 
Chapter II argued that there is a huge imbalance in the economies of Syria and 
Israel.  To establish that this imbalance exists, I used the following criteria:  GNP, percent 
growth over a fifteen-year period, and percent high technology on the market place.  The 
chapter demonstrated that the Israeli economy far surpassed the Syrian economy.  The 
Israelis relied primarily on taxes, industry and aid for generating state revenue.  Syria 
relied first and foremost on state-to-state aid, then what money state-owned industry 
could produce, and finally a limited tax base (primarily from business).  Furthermore, the 
aid that Israel receives, not only bolsters the economy, but also serves further to develop 
the military.  Because the Israeli economy far surpasses the Syrian economy, the 
imbalance is not isolated to state revenue; the military is deeply affected as well. 
2. Balance as a Function of the Military 
The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and the Syrian military reflect the relative 
economic strength of their countries.  Chapter one showed that the IDF is a far superior 
force compared with the Syrian armed forces.  This finding was based on an examination 
of the personnel, equipment and training of the army, navy, and air force of each nation.  
The result is decidedly tilted in favor of Israel.  Israeli personnel not only have better 
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morale, but their equipment is new and training more effective, thus giving them a 
distinct advantage over the Syrians. 
a. Technology 
The Israelis rely on Western (primarily American) weaponry.  Because the 
majority of Israeli weapons are from the United States, they are in good working 
condition, and America continually sells parts and supplies to upgrade and maintain the 
weapons and systems used in Israel.  In contrast, the Syrians relied on the Soviet Union, 
and with its end came the end of the weapons sales.  During the Cold War, the USSR 
provided weapons on  “good faith” credit, to balance the American presence in the 
Middle East, but after 1990 the Russian Federation demanded payment up front, 
something Syria could not do. This further exacerbated the deficiency in Syrian weapons, 
as now out-of-date Soviet armaments could not be maintained or made available for 
training. 
b. Training 
Training is an integral part of developing sound tactics and proficiency in 
the armed forces.  Here Israel again has a definite advantage over Syria.  The Israelis 
regularly conduct exercises with the U.S. military, while the Palestinian intifada has 
given the IDF practice in real-world operations.  This combined training has helped win 
the IDF a reputation as an elite force not only in the region, but worldwide.  In contrast, 
Syrian training consists of moving two tanks situated on the Golan Heights back and 
forth to simulate operations.99   Poor Syrian training is due in part to the lack of useable 
equipment, and also to insufficient funds to purchase supplies or even fuel.  
3. Does a Link Exist? 
This section has not only applied balance of power theory to the Levant, but it 
also has demonstrated that there is a definite link between military and economic 
strength.  Syria’s lack of technology and modern weapons shows how a failing economy 
hinders military development.  The Israelis have managed to separate themselves from 
the rest of the region not only with their sophisticated military technology, but also by 
their ability to maintain the weapons they have.  The link between the economy and the 
                                                 
99 Lt. Col. Scott Williams, USMC, witnessed this example while he was in Israel.   
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military may be seen in Syria’s inability to purchase the equipment, spare parts and fuel it 
needs, and consequently its poor military training.  A huge imbalance exists between 
Israel and Syria.  That this imbalance has exacerbated security concerns and instability in 
the region is self-evident.  
4. Conclusion 
 This chapter demonstrates that balance of power theory is an effective method for 
examining conflict in the Levant.  I have offered a definition of balance of power based 
on certain criteria, and find that if there is imbalance then violence is likely to occur.  To 
support this claim I discussed three case studies:  Napoleonic France, South Africa and 
the Cold War.  The first two cases illustrated that violence occurs in the presence of a 
power imbalance.  These cases further established a link between economic and military 
power.  The Cold War provides evidence that major war can be averted through a 
balance.  Having laid the groundwork, I then applied the theory to the Levant, in 
particularly to the case of Syria and Israel.  This portion of the chapter discussed the 
evidence that there is in fact an imbalance between the two rivals, previously illustrated 
in chapters I and II.  I also elaborated on the link between the economy and military using 
the models of Syria and Israel.  The next section then broke down the power imbalance 
into economic means (using chapter II for support) and military means (using chapter I as 
support).  Based on the previous chapters and this theory, I conclude that the imbalance 
between Syria and Israel has led directly to an increase in instability and insecurity in the 
region. The violence has seemed to increase, even as the disparity between Israel and 



































 This thesis has argued that the theory of balance of power is a viable tool for 
understanding the stability and security problems that plague Israeli-Syrian relations.  
Stability in the Levant can be achieved only if the imbalance ends.  The empirical data I 
have provided show that large gaps in capability exist in two areas:  military power and 
economic strength.  I do not argue that the two sides must reach complete parity, but that 
the current disparity must greatly diminish. 
 Chapter II compared the Syrian and Israeli armed forces in terms of manning, 
equipment and training.  It found that equipment and training are two critical criteria for a 
dominant military.  The data on Syria demonstrated that old, faulty equipment renders a 
military useless.  Furthermore, training is vital for proficiency, lethality and effectiveness.  
The Israeli military gap with Syria is important for discussion because it clearly shows 
that the Syrians would not last long in a drawn-out battle with the Israelis.  This is not a 
“size of the military” question in this case; the Israel and the Syrian armies are 
comparable to each other in actual numbers of troops.  The only difference is that Israeli 
forces are mainly in reserve, while the majority of Syrian troops are in the regular army.  
Rather, the gap is in capability, as calculated by training and equipment.  
 The third section of this thesis discussed the economic imbalance between Israel 
and Syria.  The military gap, while important, does not weigh as heavily in determining 
whether countries will come into conflict as does economic strength.  After all, a strong 
military does not mean a nation is intending to go to war.  The economy, on the other 
hand, dictates the strength not just of a society, but of its military as well.  It follows then 
that promoting a strong economy for both Israel and Syria is the key to stability.  
 I looked at data in three areas that give a good picture of an economy’s strength:  
GNP, rate of growth, and the percentage of GNP contributed by high technology 
industries.   It became apparent that the composition of the GNP matters.  If a nation 
relies primarily on state-to-state grants or other strategic rents to provide its revenue, the 
economic structure is likely to prove unstable.  A government with a diversified revenue 
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stream is more likely to withstand fluctuations in any given sector.  Moreover, a thriving 
GNP usually is a good indicator of strong growth.  Chapter III showed that the  Syrian 
economy is weak because Damascus persists in getting a majority of its revenue from 
state-to-state grants, while Israel’s economy, by contrast, is broad-based and supplies the 
state with revenue from multiple sources.  These sources include, but are not limited to, 
taxes--both business and personal, a robust high technology industry, exportation of 
minerals, and economic assistance. The paying of taxes is important because it gives 
citizens a stake in how the state is governed.  For their part, high technology industries 
are regarded as a proxy by which a modern economy is distinguished from a traditional 
economy.  These two sectors account for nearly 65 percent of the Israeli GNP.  Since 
reliance on rents or foreign grants is minimal, Israel maintains stability in times of 
economic hardship.  This has been demonstrated by the Palestinian intifadas, during 
which Israel suffered economic losses but its government remained stable.  
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 In this section I recommend policies that would facilitate the signing of a peace 
agreement between Israel and Syria.  A formal peace accord is in the best interest of both 
nations, for economic as well as security reasons.  Peace would open new markets that 
neither Israel nor Syria has until now been able to enter, offering new opportunities for 
growth.  Prosperity in turn keeps the populace content and decreases internal instability.  
If a nation is not worried about whether the neighboring government will fail, then it is 
less likely to engage in an excessive military build-up and risk regional instability as 
insecure neighbors follow suit. While an agreement would benefit the economies and 
well-being of both nations, there are specific conditions each would have to meet to make 
an agreement possible.  
1. Israeli Terms for Peace 
Israel has three demands that Syria must fulfill before it considers formally ending 
hostilities.  First, the Syrians must not occupy or use Lake Tiberius for water or any other 
purposes.  Lake Tiberius was annexed by Israel during the 1967 war, at the same time as 
the Golan Heights.  While Israel has agreed to the return of the Golan down to a few 
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hundred meters next to the Lake Tiberius, Israel would cede the entire Golan if there 
were a guarantee from Syria that Syrians would not occupy or use water from the lake.  
Second, Syria must withdraw from Lebanon.  This is one remaining point that 
Israel is adamant about. Lebanon once was a valuable source of revenue and trade for all 
of the Levant.  When Syria occupied Lebanon, the black market and crooked politicians 
drove business from Israel to the Syrians.  Third, Israel wants recognition from the Arab 
League for its right to exist.  This recognition is not a driving factor in regional relations, 
but the Israelis would like to extend business and trade to all Arab neighbors.  Since 
Israel reached peace agreements with Egypt in 1973 and Jordan in 1994, the Israelis have 
seen the benefits of new and extended markets in those countries.  Furthermore, it is in 
the best interests of any Arab nation to achieve peace with Israel.  Since Israel holds a 
strong lobby in the U.S. government, any neighbor that needed assistance could petition 
Israel to ask for U.S. help.  
2. Syrian Conditions for Peace 
In contrast to Israel’s demands, the conditions that drive Syrian hopes for peace 
center on the Palestinians and the hope for a nation of Palestine.  While this issue was a 
moot point until recently, the intifadas and Israeli occupations of Palestinian territory 
have vaulted this issue to the forefront of the Arab League’s agenda.  While it is possible 
that Syria would settle for an agreement as long as Israel withdraws from the West Bank 
and Gaza, the likelihood is very low.  
The second critical issue for Syria is the complete return of the Golan Heights to 
Syria. Israel could possibly have avoided losing the few hundred meters of the bank on 
Lake Tiberius, if they had not returned the entire Sinai to Egypt. As it stands, the issue of 
the Golan must be addressed in order for the Syrians to consider a peace proposal to be 
legitimate. 
The third term for peace is the right of return.  Syria maintains that Israel must 
grant all expelled Palestinians the right to return to their homeland within Israel.  Syria 
would, however, likely accept a ceremonial right of return, that is to say, as long as this 
issue was part of the peace agreement the Syrians would not demand its enforcement. 
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Finally, Syria demands that the Israelis cease expansions of settlements within 
Palestine.  The issue of Israel disbanding settlements and leaving the West Bank and 
Gaza is a potential source of conflict in any peace negotiations.  Israel has constantly 
expanded the existing land area that surrounds the settlements and pushed the 
Palestinians into a smaller and smaller area.   Therefore, the disbanding of settlements has 
become an issue that Syria will insist be settled at a peace conference. 
3. Future Prospects for Peace 
This thesis finds that prospects for future peace in the Levant rest on closing the 
balance of power gap that exists between Israel and Syria.  The military and economic 
disparity between the two countries has exacerbated security concerns in the region.   
Economic parity, however, would be reached easily if both nations would lift trade 
restrictions.  As the evidence shows, economic strength is the most pivotal factor for 
achieving strategic balance.  After all, a nation with a strong economic base has the 
means to build strong defenses and attract allies.   
While economics are one key to peace between Syria and Israel, however, 
specific issues are also inhibiting the process, as discussed in the previous section.  The 
likelihood of a solution to the Golan Heights issue is high.  Israel has reduced its claim to 
a few hundred meters; these final meters should not pose a threat to a peace agreement.  
Nor will the issue of water rights to Lake Tiberius (which is linked to the Golan issue) 
pose a problem for negotiations, since the Syrians receive greater than 70 percent of their 
water from far north in Turkey.  
The questions of Palestinian autonomy and a homeland, however, remain 
intractable problems for now.  As long as terror bombings continue in Israel proper, the 
idea of settling the dispute with Palestine is a non-starter.  If other Arab nations would 
take the initiative to stop the bombings, then Israel would be more inclined to sign a 
peace accord officially recognizing a Palestinian state. This issue will remain the chief 




APPENDIX ONE: ISRAELI NAVAL VESSELS 
Submarines: Number: Armament: 
GAL 3 SL-Harpoon SSM, 8x533mm torpedo 







Eilat Class 3 1xSA-536 Helicopter, 8x Harpoon SSM, 8x Gabriel II SSM, 
64x Barak-1 SAM Launcher, 1x76mm gun, 2x25mm Sea 




Aliya Class 2 1xSA-536 Helicopter, 8x Harpoon SSM, 4x Gabriel II SSM, 
2x20MM Guns, 1x Vulcan Phalanx, 2x12.7mm MG 
Hetz Class 7 8x Harpoon SSM, 6x Gabriel II SSM, 1-2x 76mm Guns, 1x 
Vulcan Phalanx, 2x20mm Guns, 2x12.7mm MG 
Some are used for ASW with 
2x3x324mm Torpedo with sonar 
Mivtach Class 2 5x Gabriel II SSM, 2x3x324mm Torpedo with sonar 
Patrol Craft: Number: Armament: 
Super Dovra 14 2x20mm or 2x25mm MG, 2x12.7mm MG, 1x84mm MRL 
(depth charge) 
Dabur 18 2x20mm MG, 2x12.7mm MG, 2x324mm Torpedoes, 
1x84mm MRL 
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APPENDIX TWO: ISRAELI AIR FORCE 
Model: Number in service/origin 
F-151 25 since 1998 (American) 
F-15 Eagle 73 since 1976 (American) 
F-16A/B/C/D 245 since 1980 (American) 
F-4E/RF-4E 
Phantom 
140 since 1969 (American) 
A-4 Skyhawk 120 since 1967 (American) 
Kfir C-2/TC-2/C-
7/TC-7 
35 since 1976 (Israeli, based on the 
French Mirage III) 
AH-64A Apache 42 since 1990 (American) 
AH-1G/1S Cobra 65 since 1981 (American) 
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APPENDIX THREE: SYRIAN ARMORED VEHICLES 
Tanks   
Model: Number: In service/ origin: 
T-72/T-72M 1,500-1,600 Since 1979 (Russian) 
T-62 1,000 Since 1974 (Russian) 
T-55/T-54 1,100 Since 1957 (Russian) 
APC’s   
Model: Number: In service/ origin: 
BMP-1 2,450 No data (Russian) 
BMP-2 70 No data (Russian) 
BTR-152 560 Since 1957 (Russian) 
BTR-40/50/60 1,000 Since 1956 (Russian) 
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Class: Number: Armament: 
Ossa I 6 4xSS-N-2A Styx SSM, 4x30mm Guns 
Ossa II 10 4x SS-N-2C Styx SSM, 4x30mm Guns 
ASW Assets   
Petya II 2 3x533mm Torpedoes, 4xBRU 2500 ASW 




Sonya Class 1 2x30mm MG, 2x25mm MG 
T-43 1 16 mines, 2x37mm Guns, 8x14.5mm MG 
Yevgenia Class 5 2x25mm Guns, 2x14.5mm MG 
Patrol   









THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 63
APPENDIX FIVE: SYRIAN AIR FORCE 
Type: Number: In Service/Origin: 
Mig-25 (Foxbat) 35 Since 1980 (Russian) 
Mig-29 (Fulcrum) 20 Since 1987 (Russian) 
Mig-21 (Fishbed) 200-210 Since 1974 (Russian) 
Mig-23 100 Since 1974 (Russian) 
Su-24 (Fencer) 20 Since 1988 (Russian) 
Su-20/22 100 Since 1978 (Russian) 
Mi-25 (Hind) 55 Since 1980 (Russian) 
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